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In this study we examine whether gender bias in education depends on the extent of female 
decision-making power. Household headship is used as a measure of female autonomy, with 
different types of households theorized to reflect varying degrees of female autonomy. Most 
female-headed-households in Pakistan are formed either because women are widowed or 
because husbands migrate. Women in male-headed- households are hypothesized to have 
least autonomy followed by married women heads whose migrant husbands may retain some 
decision-making power. Widow heads are hypothesized to have the greatest degree of 
autonomy among women in different households. The econometric findings suggest that 
married women heads gender-discriminate as much as male heads but that widow-heads have 
significantly lower bias against girls in enrolment decisions than male heads. The results also 
suggest that educated female heads gender differentiate less than both uneducated female 
heads and than male heads. The evidence suggests that households having better educated 
women with more independent status discriminate against the education of their daughters 
less than other households. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Women are the main caretakers of children in South Asia yet, as is well known, their 
decision-making power and autonomy in the household is often lower than that of men. Past 
studies indicate that increasing women’s status within households directs greater resources 
towards children and results in the latter’s improved health and education outcomes (Haddad 
and Hoddinott, 1995; Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman, 1997; Bruce and Lloyd, 1997; 
Durrant and Sathar, 2000; and Smith and Byron, 2005, among others). It is less clear whether 
improving women’s status within households has a differential impact on boys and girls’ 
education outcomes. Exploring this avenue is important since it could be that lower female 
autonomy is self-perpetuating because of poorer investments in girls’ education than boys’. 
This issue is especially pressing in Pakistan which suffers from both very low levels of female 
autonomy and entrenched large gender gaps in education. This study investigates whether 
women in different types of households, where they are likely to have varying degrees of 
decision-making-power, have lower pro-male education biases than male headed households, 
where women are presumed to have the least degree of autonomy. In other words, the paper 
asks whether women are the ‘fairer sex’, i.e. less inclined towards differential treatment of 
sons and daughters compared to men.  
The study uses ‘self-reported’ headship as a measure of women’s status or autonomy 
in the household. Different types of households are hypothesised to reflect varying degrees of 
female autonomy. Female autonomy may differ depending on headship type because of the 
way in which headship forms. In the South Asian context, the main processes through which 
households become ‘female-headed’ are: divorce, desertion, widowhood, out-migration, 
disablement and (the very unlikely) choice of not marrying (Lewis, 1993, pp. 24). If male 
‘presence’ reduces female autonomy, one can hypothesise that widowed women-heads may 
have greater autonomy in decision-making and implementing child-oriented expenditures as 
compared to wives of migrants whose migrant husbands may continue to be involved in long-
term household decisions. Women heads in both types of female-headed households (FHH), 
however, may be more empowered as compared to those residing in male-headed households 
(MHH).  
Clearly, like other measures of female empowerment (discussed in Section 1.2), self-
reported headship is problematic. For example, a woman may be a ‘token’ head due to her age 
(for instance a household headed by a widow) but the decision-making power may rest with a 
male. However, it is difficult to disentangle pure autonomy and agency of a woman to 
implement her say in decision-making from confounding effects using any measure of 
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autonomy. Moreover, the empirical usability of different measures differs across country-
settings and data availability. With these considerations and caveats, the self-reported 
headship measure is used because of ready availability and because it serves as a proxy, albeit 
imperfect, of female autonomy in Pakistan. However, we note that the effect of ‘headship’ 
(attempting to capture female autonomy), will be confounded by other factors such as income 
shocks and time allocation effects that are the consequence of the formation of FHHs (Chen, 
2004) and one must be wary of interpreting the effects of female headship on child education 
as arising purely due to differences in female autonomy in different households.    
Our research contributes to the sparse literature on female autonomy and education 
outcomes in various ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, there is no study in Pakistan analysing 
the effect of household type on child schooling. Household headship may have significant 
implications for educational outcomes and education expenditure allocations in general, and 
for gender gaps in these in particular. Secondly, we treat FHH as a heterogeneous group since 
varied domestic circumstances generate different types of FHHs. While a number of studies in 
Africa and Jamaica recognise the importance of heterogeneity in headship, we are aware of 
only two studies in Asia – Joshi (2004) in Bangladesh and Chen (2004) in Indonesia – that 
deal with this issue. As the resulting circumstances in which allocation decisions are made 
critically depend on how the FHH was formed, an informed analysis should ideally consider 
heterogeneity in headship. The resulting circumstances in which allocation decisions are made 
critically depend on how the FHH was formed. In our sample of women reporting headship in 
the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (2002), widows and women whose husbands have 
migrated constitute the largest percentage – 59 per cent females heading households are 
currently married and 39 per cent are widows. Children belonging to these two different types 
of FHH are said to belong to Female Currently married Women Headed Households (FCHH) 
and Female Widow Headed Households (FWHH), respectively.  
A third contribution of this study is that it overcomes a limitation of most previous 
analyses which treat female headship as exogenous. Unobserved factors determining 
household type may also be correlated with child education decisions, generating 
heterogeneity bias. A household fixed effects model helps control for family level 
unobservables and allows for within household analysis. Finally, while many previous 
analyses of household expenditure allocation between boys and girls have been constrained to 
use total household (rather than individual-level) education expenditure, Aslam and Kingdon 
(2007) note that aggregation of data at the household level mutes the true extent of gender 
bias within the household. The availability of unique, individual-level education expenditure 
data allows us to overcome this constraint.  
Our findings suggest that married women heads gender-discriminate as much as male 
heads but that widow-heads have significantly lower bias against girls in enrolment decisions 
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than male heads. The results also suggest that educated female heads have a preference for 
lower gender discrimination than both uneducated female heads and than male heads. The 
point estimates are very indicative of lower gender bias in FWHH than in MHH. However, 
we are cautious in interpreting this as a causal ‘autonomy’ effect. Time allocation effects and 
income shocks may affect children in FWHH differently compared to FHH and MHH and 
these could be partially driving the results. 
This study unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides a background of headship issues 
and child schooling decisions. Section 3 discusses empirical modelling and possible 
conceptual limitations while section 4 discusses the data and the descriptive statistics. The 
results are discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 summarises and concludes.  
2.  Female ‘Empowerment’ and Implications for Child Education 
 
‘Empowerment’ is the ability to make and implement choices and is likely to be 
affected by increased control over material, social and human resources such as earnings, 
assets, education and social capital (Kabeer, 1999; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003; and 
Smith and Byron, 2005 among others). This happens through internal and external household 
dynamics, including customs and norms regarding marriage, kinship ties and factors such as 
the age and education difference between spouses (Smith and Byron, 2005; World Bank, 
2005) and shocks such as migration, death, divorce or desertion (Handa, 1996a and 1996b; 
Joshi, 2004; and Chen 2004).  
In past studies, women’s autonomy or decision-making power has been variously 
measured as their education level; the difference in education between husband and wife (Hill 
and King, 1993; Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Haddad et al., 1997; and Glewwe, 1999; Smith 
and Byron, 2005); their employment and earning shares in household income (Haddad and 
Hoddinott, 1995; Maitra and Ray, 2001; Lancaster, Maitra and Ray, 2003); and self-reported 
headship or classifying households as men-only/women-only households (Handa, 1996a; 
Appleton, Chessa and Hoddinott, 1999; Joshi, 2004; Edlund and Rahman, 2004 and Chen 
2004). When available, direct measures of ‘status’ such as mobility, decision-making ability 
etc. have been used (Durrant and Sathar, 2000). The evidence from a majority of these studies 
suggests that improving female autonomy (howsoever defined) improves infant and child 
survival, increases child schooling and results in increased expenditure on child education and 
health. The evidence on whether increased female autonomy translates into less 
discrimination against girls (in terms of health and education outcomes) is mixed. Research in 
Cote d’Ivoire (Haddad and Hoddinott 1995), Uganda (Appleton et al 1999) and India 
(Lancaster et al 2003) suggests that women are not any less discriminatory towards girls than 
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boys. However, a study in Indonesia (Chen 2004) finds that the largest reductions in gender 
gaps in education occur through improving mother’s bargaining power within households.   
We are aware of two recent studies that explore whether increasing women’s power 
would bring about a decrease in differential treatment against girls in Pakistani households. 
Durrant and Sathar (2000) use individual and community-level measures of female autonomy 
(individual-level measures include: purdah, measures of her mobility, fear of disagreeing with 
husband, domestic violence and access to financial resources; Community-level variables 
include community-mobility index, the percentage of women in the community working 
outside the home etc.) from the Pakistan Status of Women and Fertility Survey conducted in 
rural Punjab (1993-1994). The findings show that improving women’s status at the individual 
level enhances child survival and boys’ school attendance while community-level 
empowerment variables are more important for improving the schooling chances of girls in 
rural Punjab. It appears that social values and acceptance of women’s status in a community 
are crucial determinants of gender gaps in schooling attendance in Pakistan. Another recent 
study by Smith and Bryon (2005) explores whether increasing women’s power within 
households reduces discrimination in health outcomes (child’s height-for-age Z score) against 
girls in Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan. The authors use comparable Demographic and 
Health Surveys (Pakistan data set from 1991). Women’s decision making power is measured 
using four indicators: whether the woman works for cash income, her age at first marriage, 
the percent difference in the woman’s and her husband’s age and the difference in the 
woman’s and her husband’s years of education. The authors conclude that for South Asia as a 
whole, improving women’s autonomy is effective in reducing gender discrimination against 
girls. Specifically, in Pakistan, there is convincing evidence that increasing women’s power 
benefits girls more than boys.  
As mentioned before, no study in Pakistan uses ‘female headship’ as a measure of female 
autonomy. One of the reasons is obviously the low incidence of female headship in Pakistan. 
However, there are reasons to believe that ‘reported’ headship, as opposed to any other 
measure of autonomy, may serve the purpose best in this study. Firstly, strong norms of 
patriarchy and purdah and one of the lowest female labour force participation rates among 
South Asian countries, severely limits women’s income generation in Pakistan. For example, 
among all households in our sample, only about 1 per cent are ‘female-headed’ if defined 
using headship to mean the main economic earner of the family1. Secondly, even if a woman 
were the main economic earner in a MHH, a male (husband, father, son, brother etc.) may 
control her earnings. Thirdly, even among women who never married, are divorced, 
abandoned or widowed or whose husbands have migrated, a large proportion are absorbed 
                                                 
1 As an experiment, we defined ‘economic heads’ as individuals generating maximum yearly cash 
earnings for the household. In 14878 MHH, only 188 households reveal female ‘economic heads’. 
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into male-headed households since women living without the ‘saya’ (shadow) of fathers, 
fathers-in-law, brothers etc. are ostracised in society. Consequently, women who report 
headship are clearly those not re-absorbed into male-headed households and presumably have 
some element of control, authority and decision-making power. Finally, no single measure of 
‘autonomy’ is perfect and applicability differs across country settings and data-availability. 
For example, women’s education may have a direct impact on child schooling through home-
teaching, for example (see Behrman, Foster, Rosensweig and Vashishtha, 1999), and 
including it as a measure of status or autonomy may confound findings. Morover, measures 
such as ‘difference in spousal age’ or ‘difference in spousal education’ (as used in Smith and 
Bryon, 2005), if used in the PIHS (2002) would result in a loss of information about widows 
and migrant-wives as we do not have data on spouse’s characteristics for these groups of 
women.   
Headship is a powerful measure of female autonomy as the woman-head’s control over 
resources, bargaining power, decision-making and authority may differ significantly 
depending on whether she is  a de jure head  (male is permanently absent) or a de facto head 
(male is temporarily absent) of the household2. In all cases, female headship may be 
synonymous with greater female autonomy for several reasons. It could be that women in 
female headed households are more economically active as compared to wives of male-heads 
in MHH3, possibly yielding greater control over income. Women in FCHH and FWHH may 
have a relatively larger control of income from the total income pool (from earnings, 
remittances or other sources) as compared to women with male partners residing with them. 
Female-heads could be more able to implement their preferences (for greater child education 
for example) in the absence of a male. Along the spectrum of headship, we hypothesise that 
spouses of male heads will have the least bargaining power and control, followed by wives of 
migrants (whose husbands may exert some influence on how resources are spent) with 
maximum control and authority resting with female widowed-heads. Moreover, women heads 
                                                 
2 Chant (1997, pp. 5) notes that a woman-headed household is “…a unit where an adult 
woman…resides without a male partner.” while a male-headed household often represents a “…intact 
couple…” De jure and de facto heads are defined by Chant (1997, pp. 15) as: “... de jure female-
headed unit…denote households where women live without a male partner on a more or less permanent 
basis and receive no economic support from one…This category would include single mothers, 
divorced and separated women and widows. De Facto female heads, on the other hand, …[are] women 
whose partners are absent due to labour migration, but who have ongoing contact, normally 
accompanied by the sending home of remittances. Women in this situation are thus heads of household 
on a temporary basis.”  
 
3 This does not seem to be the case in Pakistan. In our sample, 24 per cent of female heads (widowed 
and married) work and the same fraction of wives of heads work in houses headed by males. A slightly 
larger proportion of widow heads report themselves to be working (28 per cent) as compared to female 
heads who are currently married (21 per cent). 
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may also target resources towards girls more than boys in a bid to equalise resource 
allocations.  
3.  Econometric Strategy 
 
One factor explaining the lack of consensus on the consequences of headship on 
gender gaps in education is that female headship is potentially endogenous in child schooling 
and educational expenditure models. Since household type and child schooling may be jointly 
determined by unobserved factors, treating FHH as exogenous generates confusion whether 
the relationship between headship and schooling investment is causal or correlational. 
Furthermore, as female headship “…depends upon the characteristics of the marriage market, 
as well as the processes that lead to marital dissolution”4, it should be treated as endogenously 
determined. Within a marriage framework, in cooperative bargaining models (McElroy, 1990 
and McElroy and Horney, 1981), the individual’s choice to remain married depends on the 
outside options available to them. “This…‘threat point’ is a function of individual 
characteristics, especially nonlabor income and education and social or institutional factors 
that affect the attractiveness of being married. It is possible that some of the female heads of 
households who are divorced or separated had better exit options because they had resources 
to live independently.”5  
The relevance of these ideas to Pakistan - and to the two types of female headship 
defined in our study - varies. Arguably, social norms prescribing the importance of male 
presence in a household and the rarity of divorce imply that female-headed households are 
formed mostly for exogenous reasons such as death of the husband. Female headship due to 
death of husband (widowhood) may be exogenous but female headship due to migration is 
clearly not. Also, current widowhood may not be entirely exogenous as a widowed woman 
may choose not to remarry because she prefers not to have a male intervene in her 
preferences. Male migration could also be jointly determined with child educational outcomes 
or expenditure allocations: fathers with greater preference for child education may migrate to 
ensure higher incomes for better child education. Therefore, FWHH (Female Widow Headed 
Households) and FCHH (Female Currently married woman Headed Households) may be 
endogenously chosen states. 
In Section 5, we will estimate pooled models of current enrolment on the full sample 
of children in all household types and include FCHH and FWHH dummies as independent 
regressors. In another approach, we split the sample of children into those belonging to the 
different household types. Simple linear probability model and probit techniques are used to 
                                                 
4 Quisumbing et al. (2001), pp. 261.  
5 Quisumbing et al. (2001), pp. 261.  
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model the current enrolment decision (CUR_ENROL), whether the household spends 
anything on a child’s education (ANYEDEXP) and how much is spent conditional on 
spending a positive amount (LNTOTAL_EDU). In what follows, we discuss the anticipated 
problems and the solutions given possible endogeneity of FHH. 
Suppose we wish to estimate the current enrolment decision on a pooled sample of 
children aged 5-14: 
 
CUR_ENROLij = αo + α1Xj + β1FCHHj + β2FWHHj + μ    (1) 
 
where CUR_ENROL is a binary variable equalling 1 if child is currently enrolled in school 
and 0 otherwise, X is a vector of independent variables believed to determine current 
enrolment and FCHH and FWHH are the household type dummies capturing the two types of 
FHH (with the base category being MHH – Male Headed Households). μ is composed of an 
unobserved household level error term (μj) and εij, assumed to be an i.i.d error term. For 
simplicity, suppose we believe only FWHH to be endogenously determined. As stated above, 
a more independent-minded widow may chose not to re-marry because she prefers to 
implement her preferences without male interference. In this setting, the formation of a 
FWHH may occur as: 
 
FWHHj = γ0 + γ1Zj + ηj                    (2) 
 
Where FWHH =1 if the household is widow-headed and 0 otherwise, Z captures all observed 
variables believed to directly affect the formation of a FWHH (such as age at marriage, age-
gap between husband and wife, conditions in the marriage market at time of marriage etc.) 
and η captures all unobservables (such as attitudes and preferences). However, this 
unobservable is also captured in μj in the main equation of interest – a more motivated head is 
also more likely to educate her children. A more independent-minded head may also educate 
daughters equally to sons, which directly affects gender gaps in the household. In this 
instance, an unobservable determining female-headship is also likely to determine child 
schooling outcomes This generates a correlation: corr(FWHHj,μj) ≠ 0 in (1) which engenders 
endogeneity in (1). This results in biased and inconsistent parameter estimates of all included 
regressors. Specifically, β2 will be biased upwards as corr(FWHHj,μj) > 0 i.e. if more 
independent-minded women head FWHH and are also more likely to enrol children. 
Instrumental variables technique offers one solution to dealing with the endogeneity of 
household type. As always, with cross-sectional data it is difficult to find suitably valid 
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instruments- variables which determine household type but are not correlated with the error 
term in the schooling outcome and educational expenditure equations6.  
However, another constraint remains in estimating (1). By estimating models on all 
household types together, we impose the restriction that the vector of coefficients, except the 
intercept term, is identical across households. This constraint can be relaxed by analysing 
current enrolment decisions on sub-samples of children belonging to various household types 
– MHH, FCHH and FWHH. However, this introduces sample selectivity problems. For 
example, the subset of FWHH and FCHH may not be randomly drawn from the population 
and estimates, to be consistent, must account for this problem. This entails finding suitable 
‘exclusion restrictions’ – variables directly affecting selection into one type of household 
while not affecting school enrolment and expenditure decisions. As in finding instruments for 
endogenous household types, this is the key econometric problem faced by researchers. 
Household fixed effects offer a solution to the problem of endogenous selection. The 
introduction of household fixed effects controls for all unobservable household characteristics 
which may be correlated with household type, i.e. with FCHH and FWHH. This also permits 
identification of the gender gap in schooling and expenditure allocation within the household. 
Chen (2004) utilises this approach in her decomposition of differential treatment between 
boys and girls within households in Indonesia. One drawback of this approach is the 
substantially reduced sample size which results from restricting the data to a subset of those 
households with at least one male and one female child of school-going age in a given age 
range. However, the advantage of the approach is that it permits identification of gender gaps 
in schooling and educational expenditure allocations within households.  
4.  Data, Samples and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This study uses the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS 2002), the latest 
nationally representative household dataset covering more than 16000 households from 
                                                 
6 Handa (1996b) uses the following instruments for household headship: 1) level of remittances 
received by the household, 2) whether the oldest person in the household is male, 3) whether the person 
with the highest education in the household is male and 4) whether the household has no adult males. 
The plausibility of the instruments used can be questioned. For instance, arguing that the level of 
remittances does not affect household consumption (including education) other than through its effect 
on headship type seems implausible. Joshi (2004) also instruments for the two types of FHH (married 
women headed and widow-headed households) using four instruments: 1) A dummy variable 
measuring whether head’s maternal grandfather was alive at the time of her marriage, 2) average level 
of rainfall when child’s mother was aged between 11-15, 3) the fraction of the village with siblings 
resident outside the country or in the main city, Dhaka and 4) the fraction of the village with siblings 
resident in any other thana of Bangladesh other than Dhaka or abroad. Although her set of instruments 
is more plausible, such detailed data on pre-marriage circumstances of children’s mothers is not 
available to us.  
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Pakistan. To analyse the issue at hand, we constructed various sub-samples, all with 
households having at least one child aged 5-247. This yielded a total of 55669 children aged 
5-24 in all (16,195) households headed by 16,195 household heads. There are 51, 637 
children in MHH (14878 male heads) and 4032 children in FHH (1317 female heads). When 
the FHH group is broken up into its two sub-types (widow-headed and currently married 
women headed households), there are 2567 children in the FCHH sample (780 married 
women heads) and 1434 children in the FWHH (509 widowed heads) sample (See Table 1 for 
details). Depending on the analysis, these samples were further split by age-group (with 
children belonging to age-groups 5-14 and 15-24). The sample sizes are further reduced in 
fixed effects estimation.  
Household Types: Incidence of Female Headship in Pakistan 
 
The proportion of FHH in Pakistan is relatively low. According to the Pakistan 
Integrated Household Survey, roughly 7.5 per cent households were headed by women in 
1998. This figure increased to 8.13 per cent according to PIHS (2002). Corresponding 
headship figures in Bangladesh in 1996 were 15.2 per cent.   
Female headship in Pakistan typically pertains to ‘male-absence’ (either due to death, 
migration or debilitation due to illness) rather than assertion of female autonomy in 
establishing an independent household. Table 2 shows the causes of female headship in 
Pakistan. Clearly, female-headship is largely driven by marital status and the 
absence/presence of the male partner in the household. Among FHH, the largest proportion 
constitutes ‘currently married’ women (59 per cent of the sample) followed by widowed 
women heading households after their husband’s death (39 per cent).   
Given male-dominance in Pakistan, the category of ‘currently married women’ 
heading own households is puzzling. This sample of married-woman-headed households 
constitutes wives of migrant males. When building the household roster in the PIHS, the 
enumerators include members who ‘usually live and eat here’ in the household. ‘Persons who 
are working in another city/town or village and are usually residing there, visiting their family 
occasionally’ are to be excluded from the household roster8. In the roster, all members are 
provided a unique identification code, with the head of the household listed first and coded as 
1. Observationally, there are households with the female denoted as ‘currently married’, 
coded 1 and with no observations recorded for the male partner of this female. The 
characteristics and activities of these male partners of ‘female heads’ are missing in the PIHS 
                                                 
7 We excluded households without any children of school-going age so as to exclude the possibility that 
a household reports no educational expenditure because it doesn’t have a child of school-going age.  
8 Pakistan Integrated Household Survey, Enumerator’s Manual of Instructions, Round 4 (2001-2002), 
pp 3-4.  
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(2002) and there is no way of identifying these females as truly wives of migrants. However, 
we can turn to remittance information which is available (at the household-level) in the PIHS 
2002, and make some informed decisions about the migration status of these households. 
Table 3 illustrates remittances information by headship and marital status. In Table 3 almost 
18 per cent (2874/16195) of all households in the sample report receiving some remittance, 
either from within Pakistan (73 per cent) or from abroad (27 per cent). Of the 780 married 
women headed households, 735 (or 94 per cent) received remittances. Arguably, an 
overwhelming majority of married women reportedly heading households have a migrant 
husband supporting them financially. For MHH and FWHH remittances constitute relatively 
small proportions of total income (at 7 per cent and 32 per cent respectively) but for FCHH 
almost 87 per cent of total income takes the form of remittance receipts9. However, this is a 
rough approximation and it can only suggest that currently married females are most likely 
wives of migrants10. 
Migration, both within the country and abroad, is fairly common in Pakistan. 
According to the 1998 Census, 8 per cent of the population in the country (about 10 million 
individuals) constituted internal or international migrants. Migration abroad, especially to the 
Middle East, also boomed in the 1980s, constituting mostly uneducated individuals from rural 
areas whose remittances home apparently had a direct impact on rural poverty. However, 
migration within Pakistan is also a dominant feature and urban areas account for two-thirds of 
all in-migrants, according to the 1998 Census (Gazdar, 2003). 
Tables 4a and 4b show the frequency of headship among widowed and currently 
married women in Pakistan. In a majority of the cases, upon death of the patriarch, adult sons 
tend to assume headship (65.7 per cent)11 and in only 17.5 per cent of the cases do widowed 
women assume headship. A very small proportion of married women acquire headship status 
                                                 
9 We generated a variable which determines what proportion of total income (which includes wage and 
salary earnings, inheritance, remittances etc.) is constituted of remittances. 
10 As another test, we matched female heads with spouses (780 households). We find that all currently  
married FHH receiving remittances (735/735) do not have a spouse residing in that abode suggesting 
that he is alive but has migrated (this is denoted by a missing value for ‘spouse’ but is coupled with 
‘currently married’ in the marital status variable). This still leaves 45 households (about 6 per cent of 
the sample of currently married women) who do not report remittances, unaccounted for. Thirty seven 
such households do not report remittances and the spouse is not present (possibly abandoned women or 
whose husbands have migrated and are not regular remitters) and 8 of the households are ones where 
the male spouse is reported present but the declared head is the female. These 8 households are 
possibly ones where the male is debilitated due to illness. We group all 780 households into the FCHH 
category.  
11 Edlund and Rahman (2004) describe such households as ‘middle-generation’ households – where the 
headship status passes on to the adult male son (father of the child) rather than the grandmother of the 
child. This household type is compared to the ‘two generation’ household (nuclear families) housing 
just the parents of the child under consideration (with father as head) and ‘three generation’ families 
with the grandparent/s, father and children residing in a single abode and headship allocated to the 
grandfather.  
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(3.7 per cent according to Table 6.4) and, as expected, the largest proportion (68.4 per cent) of 
currently married women are the spouses of male heads.  
Household Types: Circumstances and Profile 
Table 5 describes all the variables used in the models while Table 6 shows the 
demographic and socio-economic differences between MHH, FCHH and FWHH in Pakistan. 
In Table 6, household heads in FCHH are the youngest (36.9 years on average) and those in 
FWHH the oldest (54.5 years old). AGE_OLDEST corresponds to HAGE in FWHH implying 
that age is a determinant of headship in the latter household-type. One expects the 
demographic profile of FHH to be reflective of the disruption (death/migration) which 
generated them in the first instance. FCHH are expected to be younger, having a larger 
proportion of children and a smaller proportion of adults as compared to MHH and FWHH 
respectively and this appears to be the case. The fact that FHH are substantially smaller than 
MHH is consistent with the findings of other studies (Kennedy and Peters, 1994; Kennedy 
and Haddad, 1994; Handa, 1994 and Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1995). 
The demographic features of a household are indicative of differences in the potential 
to earn, face credit constraints or be more prone to poverty. A priori, one expects FHH of both 
types to be substantially worse off in terms of assets, income and expenditure as compared to 
MHH as women generally have lower human capital and earning capacities in Pakistan. The 
data show that MHH have highest yearly income and FHH of both types have almost similar, 
lower, yearly incomes from all sources12.  
                                                 
12 The maximum earnings (MAX_EARN), the yearly earnings of the highest earner in the household, 
are lowest in FCHH (Rs. 7617) followed by FWHH (Rs. 27027) as compared to Rs. 45855 in MHH 
and the differences between FCHH and MHH and FWHH and MHH are also statistically significant.  
However, this variable is not a good measure of the true economic circumstances of the households. In 
FHH in general and in FCHH in particular, a very large proportion of the households do not report any 
positive earnings. Presumably, these households have an earning member who is not considered part of 
the household roster (migrant wives, for instance) and their main source of income is remittances. A 
more useful measure, therefore, is total household income (head and non-head income including 
earnings, gifts in cash and kind, inheritances, remittances, zakat etc.). 
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FCHH also have the lowest proportion of income-earners as they have the highest 
dependency ratio and lowest proportion of earning adults. However, per capita expenditure 
(total and on food) is significantly greater in FHH as compared to that in MHH – i.e. at least 
in terms of per capita expenditure, FHH are not poorer as compared to MHH (this 
corroborates evidence from rural India in Drèze and Srinivasan, 1997). That FWHH are not 
the poorest households in Pakistan is confirmed when we turn to measures capturing asset 
holdings of the various households. These findings suggest that although FCHH and FWHH 
have significantly lower total household incomes than MHH, they have similar or better asset-
holdings, are at least equal if not better-off in housing conditions, and are certainly not worse 
off in terms of per capita consumption expenditures.  
A large literature documents the lower resource base of widows in South Asia 
(Kumari, 1989 on India; Joshi, 2004 on Bangladesh) while a number of studies find that 
married women heads (often migrants’ wives) have a stronger asset base compared to other 
household types (Kennedy and Peters, 1992). If FHH (particularly FCHH) have a higher 
dependency ratio than MHH and a lower proportion of income earners, why then do we 
observe findings contrary to other studies in Asia? 
There are several explanations for these findings. Firstly, household income is 
affected by factors other than household demographics. For FCHH, higher per-capita 
expenditure coupled with a high dependency ratio reflects remittance income. Secondly, that 
FWHH are not the poorest among all household types could be due to selectivity: better-off 
widows may choose to remain independent heads of their own households rather than be 
subsumed back into households headed by fathers/brothers. Finally, FWHH may acquire 
headship in a joint family. The proportion of adults in FWHH reflects this and suggests that 
these widow-heads possibly reside with male income-earners (possibly children of the 
widow-head). For the purposes of this study, the finding that FHH are not poorer than MHH 
is important because we want to highlight whether schooling investments in children are the 
consequence of female autonomy (among other potential dynamics resulting from household 
formation) and prevent economic status from confounding the findings as much as possible. 
This finding, as well as our ability to control for household socio-economic status and to 
compute household fixed effects, allows us to convincingly argue that it is something other 
than socio-economic status driving the results in Section 5.  
Finally, we take a descriptive look at the allocation of education expenditures in the 
various household types in Table 6. We divide total educational expenditures into direct (sum 
of all expenditures directly paid to schools including admissions and exam fees for all school-
going children in the household) and indirect expenditures (sum of expenses on books, 
uniform, transport etc). FCHH spend the largest total amount (direct plus indirect 
expenditure) on all children’s education followed by FWHH. The least amount is spent in 
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MHH. The greater expenditure by FCHH is partly attributable to the higher proportion of 
school-age children in this type of household. However, these proportions are equally large in 
MHH and corresponding expenditures are significantly less than in FCHH.  
Educational Outcomes and Educational Expenditure by Gender 
 
Tables 7a, 7b and 7c show current enrolment rates by household type, age-group, gender and 
region. There are two main findings in the full sample (urban and rural). Firstly, current 
enrolment rates for both genders are higher in both types of FHH than in MHH. This is true 
for all age-groups. Secondly, gender gaps in current enrolment in FCHH are also larger and 
significant (5-9, 10-14 and 15-19 age groups) compared to those in MHH, while gender gaps 
are the smallest in FWHH (5-9, 10-14 and 15-19 age groups) and they are statistically 
significant only in the 15-19 age group. Thus, descriptive statistics suggest that while children 
in FHH are more likely to be enrolled in school than those in MHH, married women heading 
households enrol boys more often than girls. Thus, from the first glance at raw data, women 
do seem to have a greater preference for children’s schooling than men but they are not 
consistently more equitable than men, in terms of their allocation to boys and girls.  
Tables 7b and 7c split the samples by region (urban and rural). Table 7b reveals that 
as before, the enrolment rates (for both genders) are higher in FHH. Moreover, while 
significant gender gaps exist in MHH, there appear to be no pro-male gaps in FHH. In fact, 
FWHH have a significant pro-female bias in the 10-14 age-group. Table 1.7c reveals large 
pro-male gender gaps in rural areas – while the behaviour of FCHH is almost identical to 
MHH, FWHH either appear not to differentiate significantly by gender (5-9 age group) and 
have the lowest pro-male bias in the 10-14 age-group compared to MHH and FCHH. In 
summary, having a female head in urban areas works in favour of girls as urban female heads 
have a reduced tendency for pro-male bias (in 10-14 age group in fact have a pro-female 
bias). However, a woman heading her own household and residing in rural areas is more 
prone to a pro-male bias especially if she is married.  
The descriptive statistics presented in this sub-section reveal that there is fairly strong 
evidence of differential schooling outcomes of males and females in all age groups and that 
this differs depending on household type. Although there are pro-male biases in current 
enrolment decisions in both rural and urban areas, these are generally statistically significant 
only for MHH in urban areas and for MHH and FCHH in rural areas. Pro-male biases prevail 
in unconditional expenditure allocation even in urban areas for MHH (Tables 8a, 8b and 8c). 
Finally, MHH seem to have strong pro-male biases in expenditure allocation conditional on 
enrolment even in urban areas whereas such biases decidedly disappear for FCHH and 
FWHH in urban regions and remain only for FWHH in rural areas (Tables 9a, 9b and 9c).  
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From the descriptive statistics we conclude that much of the bias in educational 
expenditures in FHH manifests itself via significantly lower probability of girls’ enrolment (in 
rural areas) rather than lower expenditures conditional on enrolment, while for MHH the bias 
prevails in both decisions – enrolment and expenditure allocation conditional on enrolment. 
These findings provoke the question: why do these differences prevail by household type? 
This is an empirical question and we turn to an empirical analysis in Section 5 to examine 
whether belonging to a household headed by a female works in favour of a child’s education 
and whether girls are less discriminated against in FCHH and FWHH as compared to MHH.  
5.  Econometric Results 
 
Children of school-going age are split into two age-groups: 5-14 and 15-24. These 
broad age categories are necessitated by small sample sizes. Nevertheless, 5-14 still refers to 
the ‘basic education’ age group, which comprises elementary education in Pakistan. Late 
entry into school, especially girls’, and repetition and drop-out from school means many 13 
and 14 year-olds are likely to be in primary school at these ages. And, as the results later 
reveal it is the 5-14 year-olds age group where most of the interesting findings emerge. The 
results are divided into two sections. In the first section we ask: does the extent of the gender 
gap in current enrolment differ depending on household type? and in the second: within 
households of different types, does the extent of gender gap differ depending on whether the 
head is young, educated or rich?  
Household Type and Current Enrolment 
 
In the first instance, we model the parental current enrolment decision. Equations are 
estimated for children aged 5-14 and 15-24 in a pooled sample initially, ignoring endogeneity 
of FCHH and FWHH. The pooled models (using probit and Linear Probability Models, LPM) 
are estimated with and without headship-type dummies13. Equations of the following form are 
estimated: 
 
CUR_ENROLij = αo + α1Xj + β1FCHHj + β2FWHHj + μj + εij   (1) 
 
where CUR_ENROLij equals 1 if child is currently enrolled in school and 0 otherwise for 
child i in household j and X is a vector of all individual and household-level variables thought 
to influence current enrolment decisions. FCHH and FWHH are, respectively, dummies 
taking the value 1 if child i belongs to a Female Currently married woman Headed Household 
                                                 
13 Due to space constraints, regressions without household dummies are not reported.  
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(and 0 otherwise) or a Female Widow Headed Household (and 0 otherwise) with the omitted 
category being MHH. The key parameters of interest are β1 and β2, with positive values 
suggesting children in FCHH and FWHH have better current enrolment outcomes compared 
to children in MHH and negative signs denoting the converse.  
In the literature, kinship ties are often used to exclude children who are not the 
offspring of the head. As a parent is closest kin, he/she is most likely to invest in a child’s 
education as compared to, say, a grandparent (see Edlund and Rahman, 2004 and Edlund and 
Lagerlöf, 2002). Inability to identify the length of time a child has been resident in the family 
is another reason to exclude non-head’s children. These are valid arguments. However, this 
study aims to identify the effect of headship (regardless of whether the head is a parent, a 
grandparent or an uncle/aunt) on child educational decisions and all children (of head and 
non-head) are included in the samples. Small sample sizes, particularly in FHH and in 
FWHH, constrain us from excluding non-head’s children especially in fixed-effects 
estimation14.  
The dependent variable is binary (CUR_ENROL) and could be modelled using 
probit/logit models. However, we estimate LPMs because the computed marginal effects from 
the two models (probit versus LPM) are similar15 and because LPM allows easier fixed-
effects estimation. The vector X includes individual level variables such as the child’s age 
and its square (AGE and AGE2) and the gender dummy (MALE, equals 1 if child is male and 
0 otherwise), household level variables such as log of per capita expenditure (LNPCE) and its 
square (LNPCE2), a household dependency ratio (DEPEND_RATIO) equalling the ratio of 
number of children aged between 0-15 years to the number of adults aged 16 and above, and 
household head’s education and occupation16. Just as headship (and thus age of household 
head) is an endogenous variable, occupation is also a chosen state and thus endogenous, based 
on preferences that may be correlated with child education decisions. As this study later 
utilises household fixed effects, the above issues are resolved in this analysis. Dummy 
variables (URBAN and SINDH, BALOCHISTAN, NWFP, NORTH, AJK and FATA etc.) 
capture any regional and provincial differences in schooling decisions with rural areas and 
PUNJAB as omitted categories. Finally, μj in (1) is assumed to be a household level 
                                                 
14 As a robustness check, OFFSPRING (equals 1 if child is offspring of head and 0 otherwise) was 
included in the current enrolment equations estimated in Section 3.6. The coefficient was small and 
insignificant in all equations (pooled with headship dummies and in the sub-sample analyses of MHH, 
FHH, FCHH and FWHH).   
15 Probit results not reported due to space constraints.  
16 Head’s education is split into dummy variables capturing the various levels of education in Pakistan - 
less than primary (none or less than 5 years), primary (5 years), middle (6-8 years) and matric (at least 
10 years). Head’s with more than matric (i.e. those with FA/FSC, Bachelors, Masters or higher degrees, 
are the excluded category. Similarly, head’s occupation is categorised by whether they work in white 
collar jobs or service and trade-related occupations. Household heads in agriculture and elementary 
occupations (such as domestic helpers) are the excluded category. 
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unobservable while εij is assumed to be an independently and identically distributed error 
term. All estimates are corrected for clustering on Population Sample Units (PSUs).  
Table 10a illustrates some of the estimated pooled and sub-sample regressions17. The 
regression results in column (a) confirm our hypothesis that children in FHH have better 
schooling outcomes than those in MHH – a child aged 5-14 (15-24) in a FCHH and a FWHH 
is almost 12 (9) percentage points and 9 (7) percentage points more likely to be currently 
enrolled in school than a child in a MHH. In both instances the marginal effects of the dummy 
variables are significantly positive at the 1 per cent level. These findings are consistent with 
the descriptive statistics and although not directly comparable, are also consistent with Aslam 
and Kingdon’s (2007) findings of a positive coefficient on female headship in expenditure 
equations. Also note that a male child aged 5-14 is almost 20 percentage points more likely to 
be enrolled while this value drops to 12 percentage points in the 15-24 age group.  
The above analysis suffers from a number of drawbacks. Firstly, it ignores 
unobserved heterogeneity caused by μj in (1) and that the formation of FCHH and FWHH 
may not be exogenous. Secondly, pooling across all household types imposes the constraint 
that, except for the intercept term, the vector of all other coefficients is identical across 
household types. Splitting children aged 5-14 and 15-24 into various sub-samples – MHH, 
FHH and further into FCHH and FWHH – resolves the latter concern. However, the 
endogeneity of household types now becomes an analogous problem of sample selectivity.  
Columns (c) onwards in Table 1.10a report sub-sample results. As the MALE 
coefficient reveals, there is significant pro-male bias in current enrolment. The magnitude of 
this bias differs depending on household type. In a MHH a male child aged 5-14 is 16 
percentage points more likely to be currently enrolled in school. In FCHH a male child in the 
younger age-group is 18 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school as compared 
to girls and as compared to children in MHH. This pro-male bias is the smallest among 
children in FWHH where males are only 8 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in 




Measures of school availability and quality are noticeably absent from the enrolment 
regressions estimated above. However, a large literature documents the importance of school 
availability in schooling decisions especially in rural Pakistan (Sathar and Lloyd, 1994; 
Alderman et al., 1995; Sawada and Lokshin, 2001 and Andrabi et al., 2002). This continues 
to be an issue in rural Pakistan as 34 per cent of the rural communities in the PIHS (2002) 
                                                 
17 Not all estimated regressions are reported.  
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report non-availability of a government girl’s primary school compared to 15 per cent without 
a boy’s primary school. The effect of school availability on enrolment may also depend on the 
type of household a child, especially female, resides in. Widows or married women without 
resident husbands may be more sensitive to school availability in general and to ‘appropriate’ 
schools in particular, especially for girls and this may be because of a desire to protect girls’ 
reputations due to a lacking adult-male ‘saya’ (literally ‘shadow’ but used to denote 
presence). Unfortunately, detailed school availability information (and limited information on 
school quality) has been collected in the PIHS (2002) using a community questionnaire only 
in rural areas. In this sub-section, we estimate LPM models (as above) on children aged 5-14, 
separately by gender, incorporating variables which measure whether government (single-sex 
or co-ed) or private primary schools are available in the rural community in which the child 
lives. Table 10b summarises the key findings.     
Clearly, the availability of schools (especially government schools) matters for child 
enrolment. Although the effect is larger for girls than boys, this difference is statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent level only. Interestingly, there appears to be an externality on 
boys’ schooling. Moreover, among different types of households, the availability of a single-
sex government girl’s school matters in MHH and FCHH. In MHH, girls’ enrolment also 
increases with the availability of a co-ed government or a single-sex private school. 
Strikingly, FCHH appear very wary of sending girls to co-ed government schools. School 
availability (government or private) does not appear to matter for female children in FWHH 
though this could reflect the very small sample size we have.  
 
Further Estimates 
Estimates in Table 11 below correct for endogeneity by introducing household fixed 
effects. These estimates are limited to households with at least one male and one female child 
in the given age groups18. The final equation contains only AGE, AGE2 and the MALE 
dummy and we report the marginal effect on the MALE dummy variable in Table 11. The 
first two rows replicate the MALE results from Tables 10a (without fixed effects) and the 
final two rows report the marginal effect on MALE (with family fixed effects)19. 
Firstly, there is a pro-male bias in current enrolment among all household types in 
Pakistan. Secondly the coefficients on MALE in both fixed and non-fixed effects equations20 
                                                 
18 On this sub-set of children, linear models of current enrolment outcomes are estimated. All 
household level variables (such as LNHHSIZE, DEPEND, HEAD_PRIMARY etc.) are automatically 
dropped as there is no variation within the household in any household level variables. 
19 The entire set of regressions with fixed effects is not reported in this paper although the results are 
available from the author on request.  
20 The coefficient estimates across fixed and non-fixed effects estimation are very similar, though not 
always statistically identical. For instance, in age group 5-14, in MHH, B1=0.16 with a standard error 
of 0.007 and in age group 5-24 in MHH with fixed effects the coefficient value is 0.18 with a 
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are largest in magnitude for MHH and FCHH and the smallest in FWHH in both age-
groups21. In FWHH, according to the fixed effect results, a male child aged 5-14 (15-24) is 8 
(10) percentage points more likely to be currently enrolled in school than a female child. 
Thirdly, in estimates with fixed effects the difference in FWHH and MHH coefficients is 
significant for the 5-14 and 15-24 year olds. Finally, pro-male bias in current enrolment 
decisions appears to be decreasing across children’s age in MHH only. Coefficient sizes are 
significantly different only for MHH (the coefficient size is 0.18 for children aged 5-14 and 
0.12 for children aged 15-24 in MHH). 
How can we interpret the finding that gender bias is lowest in widow-headed 
households? On the one hand, for widows the investment motive may prevail – male children 
are future earners while girls are burdens to be sent to their husband’s home. On the other 
hand, having suffered widowhood, they may believe in educating girls to equip them to deal 
with life as an independent person. As suggested in Section 3.2, women’s autonomy has 
implications for child education decisions and gender gaps within households in Pakistan. We 
hypothesised widowed women as having the greatest autonomy in decision-making among 
women in different types of households and this appears to manifest itself in reduced gender 
gaps in enrolment decisions. Married women heading households behave similarly to MHH – 
the coefficient estimates are almost identical across the two household types suggesting that 
male migrants may continue to exert control over decision-making pertaining to child 
education and they seem to be driven by the investment-nature of education, with long-tern 
consequences for both parents involved, in terms of old-age support from sons.  
Household Type and Expenditure Allocation 
 
In this sub-section household fixed effects are used to investigate expenditure 
allocation decisions by household type and gender in Pakistan. Two equations, using 
individual-level data, are estimated: 1) a linear equation of ANYEDEXP (whether any 
positive expenditure was incurred on the child’s education) and 2) an OLS equation of the log 
of educational expenditure (LNTOTAL_EDU) conditional on positive educational 
expenditure22. Note that the CUR_ENROL results in previous tables and the ANYEDEXP 
coefficient estimates in Table 12 are almost identical. Our data show that parents incur 
                                                                                                                                            
corresponding standard error of 0.005. The Wald test = (B1 – B2)2/{Var(B1) + Var(B2)} which is 
highly statistically significant suggesting we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are 
equal.   
 
21 For non-fixed estimation, the difference in the FWHH coefficient (0.08) and MHH coefficient (0.16) 
for age 5-14 is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
22 We also estimated OLS equations of unconditional educational expenditure (TOTAL_EDU) but as 
the findings were not different by sub-sample and often not significant, we suppress the results.  
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positive education expenditure for currently enrolled children more than 98 per cent of the 
times, suggesting that positive education expenditure and enrolment are virtually 
synonymous.       
Table 12 reports the findings. ANYEDEXP findings are identical to CUR_ENROL 
results reported above. The main conclusion was that among the different household types, 
widow heads discriminate the least against girls in the enrolment decision. In education 
expenditure conditional on enrolment (LN_TOTALEDU), however, all household types 
discriminate against girls equally (the coefficients in MHH, FCHH and FWHH are not 
significantly different in the 5-14 age group and not significant for FCHH and FWHH in the 
15-24 age range)23.   
 
Does Extent of Gender Bias Differ Depending on Head’s Characteristics? 
 
In this sub-section we consider whether the extent of gender bias in education varies with 
the head’s characteristics within a household type. Three characteristics are considered: 
head’s education, head’s age and household per capita expenditure. We interact the MALE 
dummy with three dummy variables: 
 
1. HEAD_EDUCATED - a variable capturing whether head has any education or not 
(equals 1 if head has 1 or more years of education, and 0 otherwise); 
2.  HIGH_LNPCE - a variable capturing whether the household is rich or poor (equals 1 
if LNPCE is greater than or equal to 9 and 0 otherwise) and  
3.  HEAD_YOUNG - capturing whether the head of household is young or old (equals 1 
if head is aged 45 or less and 0 otherwise)24.  
 
The two expenditure regressions estimated with household fixed effects in the previous 
section (ANYEDEXP and LNTOTAL_EDU) are re-estimated incorporating the interaction 
                                                 
23 The computed  chi-2 value from the Wald test of equality of coefficients yields 0.94 for MHH versus 
FCHH and 0.20 for MHH versus FWHH suggesting we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are equal.  
24 We experimented with the data to decide what thresholds to create cut-off points for the three 
dummy variables. HEAD_EDUCATED equals 1 for a head with at least 1 year of education because in 
the data set it was found that 48% of MHH had 0 years of education, with figures corresponding to 
almost 78% and 75% for FWHH and FCHH. Among MHH, FCHH and FWHH with any education, the 
average years of education were as follows: 8.5, 6.1 and 5.4 years respectively. The threshold for 
LNPCE >=9 was set because among MHH the proportion with a relatively ‘high’ LNPCE were 39% 
and the corresponding figures for FWHH and FCHH were 52% and 56% respectively. Finally, 
HEAD_YOUNG was set at less than or equal to 45 years because about 35% of FWHH have heads 
aged less than equal to 45, and 85% and 48% of FCHH and MHH have heads less than equal to this 
age, respectively.  
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terms one at a time to analyse whether the head’s being young, rich or educated affects 
expenditure allocations by household type. The results are reported in Tables 13a and 13b25.  
Table 13a reports some striking differences in child educational expenditures by 
education of household head. For the younger age group (5-14), head’s education emerges as 
a significant determinant of expenditure allocation for MHH and FCHH. To interpret the 
results, consider the following example. In MHH, the coefficient on ANYEDEXP (or 
CUR_ENROL) on MALE in the 5-14 age group is 0.217 (denoting a pro-male bias) while 
that on the interaction term is -0.068. The overall effect of being a male child in an educated 
head’s household is 0.149 (0.217 minus 0.068), i.e. a boy in a MHH is almost 15 percentage 
points more likely to have positive educational expenditure than a girl. The equivalent bias is 
0.033 in FCHH, suggesting smaller gender biases in the binary (ANYEDEXP) decision 
among educated FCHH. The small pro-female bias among educated FWHH is statistically 
insignificant. The FCHH and MHH coefficients on the interaction term are -0.176 and -0.068 
respectively and are statistically significantly different from each other at the 10 per cent 
level26. These results suggest that there is significantly less gender bias in FCHH than in 
MHH when the head is educated. If education confers greater autonomy which makes it 
possible to implement one’s preferences, then educated women (albeit currently married) 
have a greater preference than educated men for girls’ education.  
Among older children, the magnitude of pro-male biases is smaller, and the 
interaction terms are largely insignificant. The overall effect of being a boy aged 15-24 in a 
household headed by an educated head is 0.119 in a MHH, 0.033 in FCHH and 0.055 in 
FWHH, indicating largest biases in households headed by males, though as stated before the 
interaction terms are insignificant. Conditional on enrolment, the coefficient on MALE in the 
LN_TOTALEDU equation is similar across the 4 household types, the coefficients being 0.17 
in MHH, 0.20 in FHH, 0.15 in FCHH and 0.17 in FWHH. These are not significantly 
different from each other. 
In summary, the findings so far suggest that in conditional education expenditure, all 
types of households bias equally against girls but that in the ANYEDEXP decision, FWHH 
bias significantly less than MHHs (Table 1.11 and 1.12) and that among the sub-sample of 
educated heads, women heads bias less (both FCHH and FWHH) than MHH although the 
results are significant only for FCHH. It is perhaps arguable whether this is because female 
heads have equalising preferences and the ability to implement them freely, since the 
                                                 
25 Results for HEAD_YOUNG suppressed as interaction terms are mostly insignificant and there are no 
significant findings suggesting that head’s age does not affect gender bias differentially across the 
different household types.  
 
26 Chi-2 value in a Wald test is 3.56 which suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis that they are 
equal at the 10% level.   
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coefficients in FWHH are not statistically significant. Had they been significant, we could 
have argued that widows, arguably with the most free will to implement preferences, are less 
prone to practice gender biases in expenditure allocation (in fact, if anything are likely to be 
female-biased) as compared to male heads. However, the lack of statistical significance of the 
MALE*HEAD_EDUCATED variable in the FWHH could be due to the small sample size in 
this group. The point estimate of the coefficient of this interaction variable (-0.143) is large, 
large enough to make educated FWHH completely free of gender bias (total effect of MALE 
in these households being 0.130-0.143 = -0.013). 
Table 13b highlights the implications for gender biases of belonging to rich 
households headed by males or females. Clearly, all households have a distinct pro-male bias 
in expenditure allocations. The striking result from this table is that well-off households of all 
types discriminate equally against girls. Although the coefficient on the interaction term in 
FWHH (-0.194) is a bigger negative than that in MHH and FCHH, it is not statistically 
significantly different from either27. However, the point estimates suggest that equally well-
off widows have much smaller gender biases as compared to MHH and FCHH.  
6.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
This study examined whether improving female autonomy (proxied by headship) has 
consequences for child education and whether female-heads are also more equalising in their 
educational expenditure allocations than male heads. All households were divided into two 
types: male-headed-households and female-headed-households. All female-headed-
households were further divided into those where the head was currently married, mostly the 
wives of an out-migrant male and women whose husbands have died leaving them widowed. 
We investigated gender bias in the current enrolment and educational expenditure allocation 
decisions by household type. We utilised a household fixed effects model to circumvent the 
problem that family’s unobserved characteristics may be correlated with household type. The 
Pakistan Integrated Household Survey, PIHS (2002) was used for the analysis.  
The descriptive statistics point to invariably larger pro-male biases in education in 
male-headed-households than in both types of female-headed-households. A first glance at 
the raw data is indicative of higher enrolment rates for both boys and girls in female-headed-
households than in male-headed-households, but female heads do not appear to be 
consistently more equitable than male heads in terms of their allocation to boys and girls. 
Moreover, much of the bias in educational expenditures in FHH manifests itself via 
significantly lower probability of girls’ enrolment rather than lower expenditures conditional 
                                                 
27 The computed value from the Wald test of equality of coefficients (MHH and FWHH) is 1.33.  
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on enrolment, while for male heads the bias prevails in both decisions – enrolment and 
expenditure allocation conditional on enrolment.  
However, our econometric results using household fixed effects estimation are of 
most interest. As mentioned in the introduction, these findings are subject to a caveat. The 
effect of ‘headship’ will be confounded by other factors such as income shocks and time 
allocation effects that are the consequence of the formation of FHHs. Consequently, one must 
be cautious in interpreting the effects of female headship on child education as arising purely 
due to differences in female autonomy in different types of households.  
The econometric findings suggest that married women heads gender-discriminate as 
much as male heads but that widow-heads have significantly lower bias against girls in 
enrolment decisions than male heads. The results also suggest that educated female heads 
gender-discriminate less than both uneducated female heads and than male heads. The point 
estimates are very suggestive of lower gender bias in households headed by widowed females 
than by males even though a Wald test shows that the difference is not statistically significant.  
 How do our findings compare with previous evidence from Pakistan? Durrant and 
Sathar (2000) found that improving female autonomy (at the community level) increases the 
likelihood of girls’ enrolment. Our findings are not so clear-cut. While other explanations are 
possible, it seems most likely that the difference between Durrant and Sathar’s findings and 
our own is that ours uses a more stringent test, based on household fixed effects analysis 
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Table 1: Relation to Head by Household Type, Children aged 5-2428 
 ALL HH MHH FHH 
   Currently 
Married 
Widowed Other29 
Relation to Head % % % % % 
Son/daughter 77.3 76.8 92.1 71.0 61.3 
Grandchild 8.2 8.2 1.1 21.6 - 
Brother/sister 5.5 5.9 0.43 0.1 3.2 
Nephew/niece 3.2 3.4 1.1 0.3 29.0 
Other30 5.8 5.7 5.3 7.1 6.5 
      
Observations 55669 51637 2567 1434 31 
 















Table 2: Causes of Headship in Pakistan   
TOTAL (MHH+FHH) FHH  
Head and: Number of 
Households 
% Number of 
Households 
% 
Never Married 548 3.4 14 1.1 
Currently Married 14485 89.4 780 59.2 
Widowed 1101 6.8 509 38.7 
Divorced 54 0.3 14 1.1 
Other 7 0.04 0 0 
TOTAL 16195 100 1317 100 
 
                                                 
28 In this sample of 5-24 year olds, we excluded individuals aged 5-24 who were: heads, spouses of 
heads, mother/father-in-law or mother/father. Our objective in analysing this sample is to understand 
enrolment and schooling decisions of children aged 5-24 i.e. of school-going age and these excluded 
individuals are not considered representative of the analysis on which samples are based. Observations 
deleted are less than 2 % of total sample.  
29 ‘Other’ includes heads who are: Never Married, Divorced or whose Nikkah has taken place but 
rukhsati is yet to occur. 28 such heads heading households were excluded from the analysis.  
30 ‘Other’ includes son/daughter-in-law, brother/sister-in-law, servants and others.  
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) = (c)/(a) 
All Heads 
 
16195  2874 18 
780 Married 735 94 
509 Widowed 221 43 
FHH 
28 Other 14 50 
Total FHH 1317  970 74 
13705 Married 1680 12 
592 Widowed 98 17 
MHH 
581 Other 126 22 




Table 4a: Widowed Women 
 
Widow’s Relation to Head 
 
No. of Widows 
 
% of Widows 
Head 509 17.5 
Daughter of head 48 1.7 
Grandchild of head 1 0.03 
Mother of head 1912 65.7 
Sister of head 78 2.7 
Niece of head 4 0.1 
Daughter-in-law of head 39 1.3 
Sister-in-law of head 47 1.6 
Mother-in-law of head 136 4.7 
Other 137 3 




Table 4b:  Married Women 
Woman’s Relation to Head No. of Married 
Women 
% of Married Women 
Head 780 3.7 
Spouse of head 13,824 68.4 
Daughter of Head 176 0.8 
Grandchild of head 23 0.1 
Mother of head 930 4.4 
Sister of head 69 0.3 
Niece of head 24 0.1 
Daughter-in-law of head 4280 20.0 
Sister-in-law of head 943 4.4 
Mother-in-law of head 35 0.2 
Other 268 1.3 









Table 5: Definitions of Variables Used in Schooling Decisions and Expenditure Functions 
Variable Definition Description 
CUR_ENROL Current Enrolment status Dummy variable equalling 1 if individual is currently enrolled in school, 0 otherwise 
ANYEDEXP Any Educational Expenditure Dummy variable equalling 1 if any positive educational expenditure is incurred for the individual, 0 otherwise 
LNTOTAL_EDU Ln of Conditional Educational 
Expenditure 
Natural log of educational expenditure conditional on ANYEDEXP being 1 
TOTAL_EDU Total Educational Expenditure Total household educational expenditure 
ADULT16_MORE Adult aged 16 or more Number of individuals aged 16 or more in the household 
AGE Age of individual (yrs)  
AGE2 Age squared Square of Age 
AGE_OLDEST  Age of the oldest member (yrs) Age of the oldest member in the household roster. 
AGE_MAX_EARN  Age of maximum earner (yrs)  Calculates the age of the individual in the household who brings maximum yearly earnings (in Rupees) for the household. 
AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir Equals 1 if  in AJK and 0 otherwise. 
BALOCHISTAN Balochistan Equals 1 if  in Balochistan and 0 otherwise 
BIKE Household has bicycle Dummy variable, BIKE=1 if household owns at least one bicycle and -0 otherwise 
CHILD0_15 Children aged 0-15 Number of individuals aged between 0 and 15  in the household 
DEPEND_RATIO Dependency Ratio Calculated as: Number of children aged 0-15/Number of adults aged 16 or more 
DIRECT_EDU_YR_PCE direct educational expenditure in 
household (Per capita, yearly) 
Sum of admissions and exam fees for all school-going children in household- the expenditure directly given to schools, 
divided by HHSIZE. 
EDU_HH_YR_PCE Per capita household educational 
expenditure (year) 
Sum of: admission fees, uniform, books, exams, tuition, transport and miscellaneous expenditures for all enrolled children 
in household. Includes a total figure for those households unable to break down the various direct and indirect educational 
expenses. Divided by HHSIZE. 
ELECTRIC Household has electricity connection Equals 1 if yes and 0 otherwise 
FAN Household has fan Dummy variable, FAN=1 if household owns at least one fan and -0 otherwise 
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas Equals 1 if  in FATA and 0 otherwise. 
FCHH Female Currently married woman Equals 1 if in FCHH, 0 otherwise. 
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Headed Household 
FWHH Female Widow Headed Household Equals 1 if in FWHH, 0 otherwise. 
FOOD_PCE_YR Per Capita Food Expenditure FOOD_EXP/HHSIZE 
FRIDGE Household has fridge Dummy variable, FRIDGE=1 if household owns at least one fridge and -0 otherwise. 
GAS Household has gas connection Equals 1 if yes and 0 otherwise 
HAGE Head’s age (yrs) Age of the household head. 
HEAD_EDU_MISS Head Education Missing Equals 1 if no observations on Head’s education, 0 otherwise. 
HEAD_PRIMARY Head has primary education or less Equals 1 if head has primary education or less, 0 otherwise.   
HEAD_MIDDLE Head has Middle education Equals 1 if head has at least 8 years education (middle), 0 otherwise.   
HEAD_MATRIC Head has matric education Equals 1 if head has at least 10 years education (matric), 0 otherwise.  
HEAD_OCCUP_MISS Head occupation missing Equals 1 if no observation on Head’s occupation.  
HEAD_WHITE_COLLAR Head White collar Equals 1 if head in white collar occupation, 0 otherwise/. 
HEAD_SERVICE Head Service occupation Equals 1 if head in service or trade occupation, 0 otherwise. 
HHSIZE Household Size Total number of members in household 
INDIRECT_EDU_YR_PCE Indirect educational expenditure in 
household (Per capita, yearly) 
Sum of uniform, books, tuition, transport and miscellaneous for all school-going children in household., divided by 
HHSIZE.  
LNHHSIZE Ln. HHSIZE  
LNPCE Ln. of Per Capita Expenditure  
LNPCE2 Ln. of Per Capita Expenditure, 
squared 
 
MALE Gender Dummy Equals 1 if child is male and 0 otherwise (female). 
MAX_EARN Earnings of the maximum earner in 
the family (Rupees) 
This includes earnings from working in the labour market. It does not include cash pensions, benefits or value of benefits 
in-kind.  
NORTH Northern territories Equals 1 if in North and 0 otherwise 
NWFP North West Frontier Province Equals 1 if  in NWFP and 0 otherwise. 
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PCE_YR Per Capita Expenditure (Rupees) TOTAL_EXP/HHSIZE 
PHONE Household has phone connection Equals 1 if yes and 0 otherwise 
PIPED_WATER Household has piped drinking water Equals 1 if yes and 0 if water is available from a hand pump, tube/open/closed well, from a pond/river/stream/canal/spring 
or otherwise 
RADIO Household has radio Dummy variable, RADIO=1 if household owns at least one radio and -0 otherwise 
ROOMS Number of rooms in household  
SEWING Household has sewing machine Dummy variable, SEWING=1 if household owns at least one sewing machine and -0 otherwise 
SINDH Sindh Equals 1 if in Sindh and 0 otherwise. 
STOVE Household has cooking stove Dummy variable, STOVE=1 if household owns at least one cooking stove and -0 otherwise 
TOTAL_INCOME_YR Total household income (yr) Total household income from all sources (zakat, remittances, earnings, gifts, inheritance etc.) 
TOTAL_EXP_YR Total household expenditure (Rupees) Sum of yearly food, non-food and all expenditures. 
TV Household has television Dummy variable, TV=1 if household owns at least 1 TV and -0 otherwise 
URBAN Regional Dummy Equals 1 if in urban and 0 otherwise (rural). 
WASH_M Household has washing machine Dummy variable, WASH_M=1 if household owns at least one washing machine and -0 otherwise 




GGOVTPRIM Girl’s government primary school Dummy equals 1 if there is a government girl’s primary school in community (PSU), 0 otherwise 
GPVTPRIM Girl’s private primary school Dummy equals 1 if there is a private girl’s primary school in community (PSU), 0 otherwise 
BGOVTPRIM Boy’s government primary school Dummy equals 1 if there is a government boy’s primary school in community (PSU), 0 otherwise 
BPVTPRIM Boy’s private primary school Dummy equals 1 if there is a private  boy’s primary school in community (PSU), 0 otherwise 
BGGOVTPRIM Boy’s/Girl’s (co-ed) primary school Dummy equals 1 if there is a government  co-ed  primary school in community (PSU), 0 otherwise 
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FCHH – MHH 
 
FWHH - MHH 
Demographic        
HAGE  45.8 36.9 54.5 -8.90 ** 8.70 *** 
HHSIZE 7.4 5.5 5.1 -1.85 *** -2.40 *** 
AGE_OLDEST  52.7 43.5 55.4 -9.17 *** 2.71 *** 
AGE_MAX_EARN 41.1 37.9 39.4 -3.21 *** -1.67 *** 
DEPEND_RATIO 1.0 2.2 0.7 1.20 *** -0.33 *** 
CHILD0_15 3.4 3.3 1.8 -0.1  -1.53 *** 
ADULT16_MORE 4.0 2.2 3.3 -1.83 *** -0.71 *** 
        
Earnings/Expenditure        
MAX_EARN 45855 7617 27027 -38238 *** -18828 *** 
TOTAL_INCOME_YR 66983 60548 60983 -6435 *** -6000 ** 
TOTAL_EXP_YR 66483 60093 61001 -6390 ** -5483 * 
PCE_YR 10257 12470 12457 2213 *** 2200 *** 
FOOD_PCE_YR 5993 7549 8250 1556 *** 2256 *** 
        
Educational Expenditure        
EDUHH_YR_PCE 500 922 772 423 *** 273 *** 
DIRECTEDU_YR_PCE   178 320 286 141 *** 108 *** 
INDIRECTEDU_YR_PCE 264 537 439 273 *** 175 *** 
        
Assets (percentage)        
FRIDGE 22.5 26.5  30.9 4.0 * 8.4 *** 
FAN 83.8 84.3 92.4 0.5  8.6 *** 
WASH_M 33.1 31.6  42.1 -1.4  8.9 *** 
STOVE 28.2 29.7  42.3 1.5  14.1 *** 
BIKE 33.2 17.3  25.5  -15.8 *** 7.7 *** 
TV 38.1 40.0  50.7 2.0  12.7 *** 
RADIO 34.2 43.9  33.9 9.7 *** -0.3  
SEWING 53.1 55.4 59.2 2.3  6.1 *** 
        
Housing        
ROOMS 2.4 2.4 2.5 0  0.1 * 
ELECTRIC 69.2 76.6 86.1 7.5 *** 0.7 *** 
GAS 21.4   13.5 33.1 -7.9 *** 0.1 *** 
PHONE 11.8 16.6  18.9  4.8 *** 0.1 *** 
PIPED_WATER 31.5 28.9 45.5 -2.7  14.0 *** 
Note: *, **, and *** signify that the difference is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 7a: Current Enrolment Rates31 by individual, age-group, gender and headship 
status: URBAN and RURAL 
Age 5-9 Age 10-14 Age 15-19  
Households 
 
B G Gap  B G Gap  B G Gap  
All HH 59 47 12 *** 69 49 20 *** 39 23 16 *** 
MHH 58 46 12 *** 67 48 19 *** 38 22 16 *** 
Married 75 59 16 ** 84 63 21 *** 54 35 19 ** FHH 
Widowed 74 67 7  67 64 3  45 34 11 * 
 
 
Table 7b: Current Enrolment Rates by individual, age-group, gender and headship 
status: URBAN only 
Age 5-9 Age 10-14 Age 15-19  
Households 
 
B G Gap  B G Gap  B G Gap  
All HH 71 66 5 *** 75 70 5 *** 45 38 7 *** 
MHH 71 65 6 *** 75 69 6 *** 44 37 7 *** 
Married 83 77 6  79 85 -6  56 56 0  FHH 
Widowed 83 77 6  69 80 -11 * 48 47 1  
 
Table 7c: Current Enrolment Rates by individual, age-group, gender and headship 
status: RURAL only 
Age 5-9 Age 10-14 Age 15-19  
Households 
 
B G Gap  B G Gap  B G Gap  
All HH 53 38 15 *** 66 36 30 *** 35 13 22 ** 
MHH 52 37 15 *** 65 35 30 *** 34 12 22 *** 
Married 72 55 17 *** 86 55 31 *** 53 27 26 *** FHH 




                                                 
31 ‘Other’ category in FHH (including Never married and Divorced) contains too few observations-5, 7, 
13 and 5 (total 30) respectively in the age groupings from 5-24.  
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Table 8a: Annual Educational Expenditure (Rs./yr) on ALL children (Unconditional): Urban + Rural  
Age 5-9 Age 10-14 Age 15-19 Age 20-24  
Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  
All Households 874 709 165 *** 1338 997 341 *** 1389 820 569 *** 618 284 334 *** 
MHH 884 697 187 *** 1391 1012 379 *** 1576 852 724 *** 987 439 548 *** 
FCHH 1224 873 351 ** 1799 1373 426 ** 2723 1729 994 * 3199 770 2429 * 
FWHH 1939 1449 490  2227 1696 531  2057 1424 633 * 1695 414 1281 ** 
 
FHH 
FHH 1387 1023 364 ** 1946 1462 484 ** 2434 1599 835 * 2186 554 1632 ** 
 
Table 8b: Annual Educational Expenditure (Rs./yr) on ALL children (Unconditional): Urban Only 
Age 5-9 Age 10-14 Age 15-19 Age 20-24  
Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  
All Households 1839 1548 291 ** 2279 1986 293 ** 2402 1708 694 *** 1643 730 913 *** 
MHH 1795 1506 289 ** 2230 1934 296 * 2336 1609 727 *** 1602 719 883 *** 
FCHH 2281 2049 232  3090 2715 375  4460 3402 1058  5123 1715 3408   
FHH FWHH 3054 2505 549  2670 2490 180  2453 2322 131  1391 480 911 * 
 
Table 8c: Annual Educational Expenditure (Rs./yr) on ALL children (Unconditional): Rural Only 
Age 5-9 Age 10-14 Age 15-19 Age 20-24  
Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  
All Households 496 335 161 *** 977 502 475 *** 1125 383 742 *** 610 230 380 *** 
MHH 460 316 144 *** 933 474 459 *** 1077 345 732 *** 524 227 297 ** 
FCHH 928 568 368 *** 1409 847 562 *** 1935 1000 935 ** 2250 212 2038 **  
FHH FWHH 1110 621 489 * 1812 744 1068 * 1425 361 1064 ** 2282 327 1955 * 
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Table 9a: Annual Educational Expenditure (Rs./yr) on ENROLLED children (Conditional): Urban + Rural  
Age 5-9 Age 10-14 Age 15-19 Age 20-24  
Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  
All Households 1495 1513 -18  1941 2063 -122 ** 3629 3695 -66  6260 5646 614  
MHH 1542 1519 23  2040 2147 -107  4143 3848 295  8916 6952 1964 * 
FCHH 1642 1473 169  2137 2163 -26  5080 4875 207  13280 5301 7979 * 
FWHH 2637 2197 440  3313 2720 593  4634 4273 361  11423 5158 6265 * 
 
FHH 
FHH 1865 1673 192  2459 2325 134  4910 4626 284  10750 5237 5513  
 
Table 9b: Annual Educational Expenditure (Rs./yr) on ENROLLED children (Conditional): Urban Only 
Age 5-9 Age 10-14 Age 15-19 Age 20-24  
Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  
All Households 2355 2589 -234 * 2868 3043 -175  5377 4491 886 ** 8715 6556 2159 *** 
MHH 2314 2519 -205 * 2835 2997 -162  5291 4360 931 * 8995 6678 2317 ** 
FCHH 2769 2672 97  3900 3177 723  7906 6098 1808  8350 5635 2715 **  
FHH FWHH 3690 3304 386  3872 3221 651  5152 5059 93  7950 5658 2292  
 
Table 9c: Annual Educational Expenditure (Rs./yr) on ENROLLED children (Conditional): Rural  
Age 5-9 Age 10-14 Age 15-19 Age 20-24  
Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  Boy Girl Gap  
All Households 941 876 65 * 1484 1384 100  3218 2896 322  7193 5237 1956  
MHH 897 858 39  1444 1360 84  3166 2814 352  7716 6463 1253  
FCHH 1283 1038 245 * 1645 1545 100  3698 3758 -60  6555 4136 2419   
FHH FWHH 1665 1067 598 * 1876 1675 201  3632 1955 1677 * 5438 4410 1028 * 
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Table 10a: Linear Probability Model of Current Enrolment, Children Aged 5-14 and 15-24 
 Pooled MHH FCHH FWHH 
















MALE 0.20 *** 0.12 *** 0.16 *** 0.12 *** 0.18 *** 0.15 *** 0.08 ** 0.07 ** 
AGE 0.30 *** -0.23 *** 0.26 *** -0.23 *** 0.23 *** -0.25 *** 0.10 ** -0.23 *** 
AGE2/10 -0.13 *** 0.05 *** -0.13 *** 0.05 *** -0.11 *** 0.05 ** -0.06 ** 0.04 ** 
LNHHSIZE 0.07 *** 0.04 *** 0.07 *** -0.04 *** 0.11 *** 0.12 *** 0.07  0.08 * 
DEPEND_RATIO/100 -0.49  -0.10  -0.63  -0.68  0.18  -0.02  -0.19  -5.22  
LNPCE 1.11 *** -0.26 ** 1.05 *** -0.29 ** 1.84 *** 1.19 ** 1.30 *** 0.63  
LNPCE2 -0.05 *** 0.02 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 *** -0.09 ** -0.05 * -0.10 ** -0.02  
HEAD_EDU_MISS -0.20 *** 0.03  -0.20 *** 0.04  0.07  -0.20  -0.33 ** -- -- 
HEAD_PRIMARY -0.20 *** -0.18 *** -0.20 *** -0.18 *** -0.10  -0.16  -0.16 * -0.25 ** 
HEAD_MIDDLE -0.04 *** -0.10 *** -0.04 *** -0.11 *** 0.02  0.10  0.10  0.09  
HEAD_MATRIC -0.02  -0.08 *** -0.02  -0.08 *** -0.05  0.05  0.12  0.02  
HEAD_OCCU_MISS 0.05 *** 0.01 * 0.06 *** 0.01  -0.04  -0.00  -0.01  0.07  
HEAD_WHITE_COLLAR 0.07 *** 0.05 *** 0.07 *** 0.05 *** 0.00  -0.03  -0.10  0.12  
HEAD_SERVICE 0.06 *** 0.02 ** 0.07 *** 0.02 ** -0.14 * -0.10  -0.04  0.09  
SINDH -0.20 *** -0.04 *** -0.15 *** -0.04 *** -0.21 * -0.17 ** -0.02  -0.06  
NWFP -0.08 *** 0.01  -0.08 *** 0.01  -0.12 *** -0.00  -0.03  0.02  
BALOCHISTAN -0.21 *** -0.03 *** -0.21 *** -0.03 *** -0.48 *** -0.19 * -0.20 * -0.07  
AJK 0.10 *** 0.08 *** 0.13 *** 0.09 *** 0.02  0.05  0.26 *** 0.08  
NORTH 0.03  0.21 *** 0.03  0.21 *** 0.07  -0.01  0.18 * 0.16  
FATA -0.30 *** -0.08 *** -0.30 *** -0.08 *** -0.43 *** -0.16  -0.11  -0.22  
URBAN 0.07 *** 0.03 *** 0.07 *** 0.03 *** 0.04  0.02  0.13 ** -0.00  
FCHH 0.12 *** 0.09 *** -  -  -    -  -  
FWHH 0.09 *** 0.07 *** -  -  -    -  -  
CONSTANT -6.51 *** 3.45 *** -6.21 *** 3.47 *** -9.87 *** -3.74  -6.28 *** -0.59  
                 
Pseudo_R2 
N 


























Note: Coefficients are presented for LPM models. (*) denotes significance at 10 %, (**) at 5 and (***) at 1 per cent. The dependent variable is CUR_ENROL (=1 if child is currently enrolled in school and 0 
otherwise). Base dummy for Head’s education is HEAD_MATRICMORE =1 if head has more than 10  years of education  0 otherwise. Base dummy for Head’s Occupation is HEAD_AGRI =1 if the head is involved 
in agricultural or elementary occupations (such as domestic helpers etc), Punjab and rural areas are the omitted categories in provincial and region dummies. (-) denotes not included and (--) denotes where a variable 
predicts success perfectly.   
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Table 10b: Linear Probability Models of Current Enrolment (School Availability) in Rural Communities, Children Aged 5-14 
Pooled Sub-sample 
W/o  dummy With dummy MHH FCHH FWHH 
 
Variable 
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys 










































































*** -  -  -  -  -  -  




 -  -  -  -  -  -  
                     
All controls (as in 3.10a) Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
                     
N 10570  11641  10570  11641  9777  10761  631  710  159  169  
R2 0.25  0.20  0.25  0.21  0.24  0.20  0.30  0.20  0.36  0.33  
                     
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. (*) denotes significance at 10 %, (**) at 5 and (***) at 1 per cent. The dependent variable is CUR_ENROL (=1 if child is currently enrolled in school and 0 otherwise). 
GOVTPRIM =1 for girls if government girls primary school is available in rural community, 0 otherwise. GOVTPRIM =1 for boys if government boy’s primary school is available in rural community, 0 otherwise etc. 
                                                 
32 Note that we do not include private co-ed primary schools. The proportion of villages reporting these schools was very small. 
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Table 11: Marginal Effect on MALE dummy in Current enrolment equations (Without 
and with household fixed effects) 
 MHH FHH FCHH FWHH 
No Fixed Effects     


















N 52813  3956  2546  1371  
         
With Fixed Effects         


















N 38083  2553  1643  901  
         
Note: Coefficient values reported with standard errors in brackets. (*) denotes significance at 10%, (**) 
at 5% and (***) at 1%. Shaded cell’s coefficients are statistically different at the 5% level in a chi-2 
distribution (FWHH versus MHH across columns and MHH of both age-groups across rows).  
 
 
Table 12: Coefficient on MALE dummy and t value (brackets), (with household fixed 
effects): All age groups. 
 MHH FHH FCHH FWHH 
ANYEDEXP     
















     
LN_TOTALEDU     
















     
Note: t-values are in parentheses and those significant at the 5% level are shaded.  
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Table 13a: Coefficient on MALE dummy and MALE*HEAD_EDUCATED interaction term and 
t values (brackets), (with household fixed effects), All age groups.  
  MHH FHH FCHH FWHH 
Age 5-14: MALE 
 
     
      
















































      
Age 15-24: MALE 
 
     
      
















































      




Table 13b: Coefficient on MALE dummy and MALE*HIGH_LNPCE interaction term and t 
values (brackets), (with household fixed effects), All age groups.  
  MHH FHH FCHH FWHH 
Age 5-14: MALE 
 
     
      
















































      
Age 15-24: MALE 
 
     
      
















































Note: t-values significant at 5% are shaded.  
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